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Abstract
This  paper analyses an indefinitely-repeated Cournot duopoly. Firms select simple dynamic
decision  rules which, taken together, comprise a first-order linear difference equation system. A
boundedly-rational  objective function is assumed, by which the firm’s payoff is its profit at the
point  of convergence, if any. Stable Nash equilibria are characterised and located in output space,
stability  in this context being equivalent to subgame-perfection. Comparable results are derived
for  a conventional discounted-profit objective function, where this equivalence does not hold, but
where  stability may nevertheless be of intrinsic interest. In either context, stability is incompatible
with joint profit maximisation.
*  This paper is part of the project  Evolution, oligopoly and competitiveness,  funded by the ESRC,
grant number R000 23 6179. Comments are very welcome.1 See, for example, Stanford (1986a), Klemperer and Meyer (1989), or Grossman (1981).
1
1 Introduction and overview
In  this paper we analyse an indefinitely-repeated Cournot duopoly, within a framework motivated
by  the idea of bounded rationality. Characteristic of this is the proposition that computational
simplicity  is valuable to agents. In our model, simplicity is an issue at two levels. The first, and
more  familiar, is that of the firm’s strategy. Among the simplest types of strategy, in this dynamic
context,  is the Reaction Function, which gives the firm’s current output as a time-independent
function  of its rival’s immediately previous output. Similarly, a Supply Function has as its only
argum ent the immediately previous market price. Strategies of this kind have received much
attention  in the literature
1,  perhaps reflecting a widespread, if tacit, assumption that agents value
simplicity. 
But  the second level is that of the objective function, in terms of which firms identify their
(mutually)  optimal strategies. Even if both firms’ strategies are very simple, the implied sequence
of  outputs can be highly complicated and, therefore, difficult to evaluate. So firms might be
forced, or choose,  to simplify this task. One possibility, which we explore in this paper, is that a
boundedly-rational  firm evaluates an output sequence only at its point of convergence, if any. In
the  case of a convergent sequence, this is effectively equivalent to a fully-rational firm with a zero
discount  rate, using a limit-of-mean-profit criterion. But it is stronger than this criterion, in that
it places a zero value on non-convergent sequences. 
Our  analysis focuses on the asymptotic stability of outputs, in a Nash equilibrium. Given the
assumed  objective function, stability here is equivalent to subgame-perfection. For a fairly simple
class  of strategy, to be defined shortly, we show that almost any profitable output point can be
supported  as a stable, boundedly-rational equilibrium. Notably excluded, however, is the duopoly
contract curve, comprising points of mutual profit maximisation.
We also analyse stability in the fully-rational, discounted profit case. As already noted, our
boundedly-rational equilibrium  is largely equivalent to the limiting (zero discounting) case. But
in  the fully-rational context stability does not imply subgame-perfection. Indeed, we find here that2 It is well known that subgame-perfect equilibria can be sustained by discontinuous trigger
strategies,  as in Friedman (1971) and Abreu (1986). However, Friedman and Samuelson (1994)
showed that continuous versions of such strategies could be found.
2
linear  Reaction Functions, for example, can support stable equilibria where subgame-perfection
is  known to require rather more complex strategies. The lower the discount rate, the larger is the
set  of output points thus supportable. This raises the possibility of stability constituting a weak
form of equilibrium refinement for fully-rational firms constrained to the simplest of strategies.
For  the purposes of exposition, the paper deals first with the fully-rational case. Here, we are
interested in strategy pairs which satisfy three criteria:
Q Equilibrium, i.e., the mutual optimality of each firm’s strategy;
Q Stationarity of the generated output sequence, which means simply that outputs (and thus
the price) are constant from one period to the next;
Q Stability, i.e., re-convergence to the stationary point following any deviation from it.
Taking  only the first two criteria, we might ask whether a given output vector can be supported
as  a stationary equilibrium, i.e., as the stationary output sequence of a Nash equilibrium strategy
pair.  It may easily be shown that, given concave profit functions, any profitable output point can
be thus supported (Proposition 1), and that this requires only (linear) Reaction Functions. 
Subgame-perfection  is, of course, more demanding. Thus, Stanford (1986a) demonstrates that
Reaction  Functions (linear or otherwise) can support subgame-perfect equilibria only at the
standard  Cournot equilibrium point. Friedman and Samuelson (1994) use the term  single-period
recall function (SPRF) to describe a strategy which gives a firm’s output as a function of the
immediately  previous outputs of both firms, and of which the Reaction Function (as defined here)
is  a special case. They identify a class of continuous, non-linear, SPRFs capable of supporting a
subgame-perfect  equilibrium at any profitable output point.
2 This complements Stanford’s result,
and  also that of Robson (1986), who shows that linear SPRFs can support such equilibria only3
at  the Cournot point. Such results are important because they tell us something about the degree
of  strategic complexity required to support (subgame-perfect) equilibria. And complexity is of
inter est, perhaps, because we can more plausibly imagine real firms using simple rules than
complex  ones. As already suggested, this idea could be articulated in terms of bounded rationality,
by  supposing that the use of a more complex rule is more demanding on a firm’s limited or costly
computational resources. 
The  assumption in this paper is that both firms adopt linear SPRFs which, as noted, are
insufficient  for a subgame-perfect equilibrium other than at the Cournot point. However, our main
interest  is not subgame-perfection as such, but rather the third criterion listed above, i.e., that of
stability.  We find (Proposition 2) that linear SPRFs can support stable equilibria at a wide range
of  output points. Notably excluded, however, are points of mutual profit-maximisation, i.e., the
contract  curve. At best, in the limiting case of a zero discount rate, equilibria here may be “semi-
stable”  in that there is re-convergence, following any deviation, but generally to some other point,
off  the contract curve. We also consider two special cases of linear SPRF. The first is a Reaction
Function;  here the stable equilibria comprise a cross-shaped set containing the two firms’ Cournot
(contemporaneous)  best-response curves. The second is a Supply Function; here the stable
equilibria  form a curved band running close to, but strictly above, the contract curve. In each case,
the  size of the corresponding set is positively related to the per-period discount factor, i.e.,
negatively related to the discount or interest rate.
We then similarly analyse a boundedly-rational equilibrium. Just as in the fully-rational case,
stationary  equilibria may be found at any profitable output point (Proposition 3). The significance
of  stability, in this context, is that it is here equivalent to subgame-perfection (Propositions 4a and
4b).  Stable equilibria, while more widespread than in the fully-rational case, are not quite
ubiquitous (Proposition 5). Again  notably excluded are points on the contract curve. Equilibria
here are, at best, semi-stable. But they cannot be subgame-perfect.
The  paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we define and elaborate our assumed class of
strategies.  Section 3 outlines our assumptions concerning the firm’s profit function. Conventional,
full y-rational, stationary equilibria are characterised in section 4.  The stability condition is4
introduced  in section 5, and applied to the fully-rational equilibrium (Proposition 2). Finally,
section 6 contains our analysis (Propositions 3-5) of boundedly-rational equilibria.
2 The Decision Rule
The model comprises two firms producing an homogeneous good. In each period  , ( t’0 , 1 , 2 , . . )
each  firm   produces an output level  ,  giving an output vector  .  We ( i’1 , 2 ) xi, t xt’ ( x1 , t, x2 , t)
assume  no restriction on the output space other than that it is real, so that the set of feasible
output  vectors is  .  Let   denote an entire sequence of such X/{xt * xt0œ2} P’+x0, x1, x2, . . ,
output  vectors. We describe as  stationary (at ) any output sequence   such that   for x0X P xt’x
all  t. 
Governing  each firm’s behaviour is a time-independent decision rule which makes   a linear xi, t
function  of the outputs of both firms in the immediately preceding period. This  first-order linear
decision rule (FOLDR) is defined by a real triple   such that: Di’( ai, bi, ci)
xi, t%1 ’ aixi, t % bixj, t % ci ( i ￿j)
This  is a special (i.e., linear) case of what Friedman and Samuelson (1994) call a  single-period
recall function. Two subclasses of FOLDR which will be of interest are:
(i) A  Reaction Function (RF), defined by  , in which  firm  iNs  output is a function only ai’0
of firm  jNs (immediate past) output.
(ii)A  Supply Function (SF), defined by  ,  in which firm  iNs  output is, in effect, a function ai’bi
only of the (immediate past) market-clearing price.
At  the outset   each firm adopts a  strategy   comprising an initial output and a ( t’0 ) Fi’+xi, 0, Di,3 Notice that we use  x with a single subscript to denote either the (timeless) output of a
given  firm ( i or  j),  or the output vector in a given time period ( t).  While convenient, this is
potentially  ambiguous if the subscript is a numeral. Hereafter, single subscripts 1 or 2 refer only
to the firms, while 0 refers to the initial time period.
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FOLDR. The strategy pair     generates a unique output sequence  which we call its F’( F1, F2) PF
trajectory. The trajectory of   is stationary at   only if, for each  i :
3 F x’( x1, x2)
(1) xi ’ aixi % bixj % ci
Given   ,  let   denote the set of all   satisfying (1). We call this the  stationary set for  . Di Si( Di) x0X Di
A  stationary solution for   is any: D’( D1, D2)
x 0 S( D)/ S 1( D1)_ S 2( D2)
A strategy pair   can be equivalently represented as  . From the  definition of F’( F1, F2) F’+x0, D,
, it follows that the trajectory of   is stationary if and only if  . S( D) F’+x0, D, x00S( D)
We describe as  regular any   for which  , in which case (1) may be rewritten as: Di ai￿1








We similarly describe as regular any   of which each   is regular. For a regular  , D’( D1, D2) Di D
therefore,   comprises solutions to  (2) for each   simultaneously. There will be exactly S( D) i’1 , 2
one  such solution, unless  .  In that case the two stationary sets will either coincide (if $1$2’ 1
), giving infinitely many stationary solutions, or fail to intersect, giving none. (i’ $i(j6
3 Profit in a single period
We consider equilibria within  , where: SdX% %dX
and X % %/{x0X* x1, x2$0} S / {x0X % %* B1( x) , B2( x)>0}
For any , the profit for firm  i in period  t is given by: xt0X% %
Bi( xt)’ xi, t f( x1 , t%x2 , t)& gi( xi, t)
where    is the market-clearing price and   is firm  i’s  total cost. We assume that f( x1 , t%x2 , t) gi( xi, t)
each  of these functions is differentiable, and that   for all  .  We also assume that, within f)<0 x0S
,   is quasiconcave . X% % Bi( . )
Figure 1: A typical iso-profit contour 7








Two particular points on the contour may be noted. One is where   and thus: si’0
giN ’ f % xi fN
so  that firm  i's  marginal cost is equal to its marginal revenue, given  .  The other is where  xj si’&1
and  thus marginal cost is equal to price. Figure 1 shows each respective locus,   and  .  The Ni Ti
former  corresponds to the standard Cournot (contemporaneous) best-response function. The
latter, which we term the  Walrasian locus, corresponds to price-taking profit maximisation.
These  assumptions, and the representation in Figure 1, are quite conventional. However, since our
decision  rules do not constrain output trajectories to  , and since we need firms to  be able to X % %
evaluate  any (non-equilibrium) trajectory, then we have to make some further, unconventional
assumptions.  We shall therefore assume that   and  are defined for all  ,  in such a way f( . ) gi( . ) x0X
as  to maintain quasiconcavity of each   everywhere. Consistent with this are, for example, Bi( x)
the extensions defined by:
f( x)’ f (max { 0 , x1}% max { 0 , x2}) gi( xi)’ gi( max { 0 , xi})
An  alternative approach would be to restrict the output trajectories by truncating the firms’
decision rules as, for example:
xi, t%1 ’ max . {0,aixi, t%bixj, t%ci }
Such  an approach is adopted by Stanford (1986b). For our purposes, however, the former
approach is simpler and more tractable.8
4 Stationary, fully-rational equilibria
In  a fully-rational equilibrium, each firm’s strategy maximises the discounted sequence of that





The  discount factor   we assume to be common to the two firms; this simplifies the *0( 0 , 1 )
analysis,  but is not crucial to it. Consider some strategy pair   such that   is stationary ˆ F’( ˆ F1, ˆ F2) Pˆ F
at  . Thus for each firm  i: ˆ x
and (3) ˆ xi, 0 ’ ˆ xi ˆ xi ’ ˆ ai ˆ xi % ˆ bi ˆ xj % ˆ ci
Given  , under what conditions is   optimal for firm  j? ˆ Fi ˆ Fj
Suppose  firstly that  .  Since   is stationary, it follows that   and  , ˆ bi’0 Pˆ F xi, 0’ ˆ xi ˆ Di’ ( ˆ ai, 0, ( 1 &ˆ ai)ˆ xi)
i.e., that firm  i’s output is independently stationary at  . But then   is optimal if and only if  ˆ xi ˆ Fj ˆ x
maximises each   subject to  . A  necessary condition for this is  , i.e., that the Bj( xt) xi, t’ ˆ xi sj( ˆ x) ’0
slope  of firm  j’s  iso-profit contour be zero. This is also sufficient, given quasiconcavity of  . Bj( . )
We can thus verify the existence of a repeated Cournot equilibrium, where each firm’s output is
independently stationary at   defined by  . x0S s1( x) ’s2( x) ’0
 
Now  suppose instead that  .  Given that   satisfies (3),   is optimal if and only if  ˆ bi￿0 ˆ Fi ˆ Fj Pˆ F
maximises   subject to, for all  t: Aj( P)
and xi, 0 ’ ˆ xi, 0 xi, t%1 ’ ˆ aixi, t % ˆ bixj, t % ˆ ci




’ & *T MBj( ˆ x)
Mxi
sj( ˆ x)& * ˆ bij
4
t’T
( *ˆ ai) t&T4 Note the formal similarity between this proposition and the ubiquity of consistent-
conjectures  equilibria, as demonstrated by Klemperer and Meyer (1988), and similarly central to
which  is the tangency of the (conjectured) reaction function of one firm to an iso-profit contour
of the other.
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For   to be optimal it is necessary that (4) is zero for every  T.  That is: ˆ Fj
  and (5) &1<* ˆ ai <1 sj( ˆ x)’
* ˆ bi
1 &* ˆ ai
Note  that (5) also characterises the optimal   given  and  , and therefore some ˆ Fj &1<* ˆ ai <1 ˆ bi’0
of the Cournot equilibrium strategies.
For an illustrative interpretation of (5), suppose  that   is an RF, so that   and the first part ˆ Di ˆ ai’0
of  the condition is satisfied. Then any single-period output perturbation by firm  j induces an
output  response by firm  i in, and only in, the following period. The ratio of the latter to the former
is  , here  the gradient of  . The second part of (5) then requires that the net (discounted) ˆ bi Si( ˆ Di)
effect  on firm  j’s  profit is zero. In the limiting case with zero discounting  ,  this implies that ( *’1 )
firm  j’s iso-profit contour is tangent to  .  Si( ˆ Di)
For  FOLDRs in general, (5) is most easily interpreted in this limiting case, where the first part of
the  condition  is that  .  This implies that following any single-period perturbation in firm ˆ ai0( &1 , 1 )
j’s  output, firm  i’s  output will re-converge to  .  If this were not the case, then firm  j could ˆ xi
thereby  induce, for example, an indefinite (unlimited) reduction in firm  i’s  output. Given that
,  the cumulative total of all subsequent output responses by firm  i converges to  ,  as ˆ ai0( &1 , 1 ) ˆ $i
a proportion of firm  j’s  initial perturbation. For marginal perturbations, the second part of (5)
requires  that the net (in this case, undiscounted) effect on firm  j’s  profit is zero.  Again, in this
limiting case this implies that firm  j’s iso-profit contour is tangent to  .  Si( ˆ Di)
In  addition to being necessary, (5) is also sufficient for optimality if   is concave, which Aj( P)
would  follow from concavity of  .  It would also be sufficient were   only quasiconcave, Bj( . ) Aj( P)
but  this does not follow from quasiconcavity of  .   Given a sufficiently strong assumption of Bj( . )
this kind, stationary equilibria are ubiquitous in  S, as stated in the following Proposition.
410
Proposition 1 Given  concavity of  ,  then for any   and any  there exists Bi( . ) x0S *0( 0 , 1 )
an equilibrium    such that   is stationary at  x. F’+x0, D, PF
Proof:Given  x and  *, put  , and construct  D to satisfy (1) and (5), i.e,: x0’x
*ai0( &1 , 1 ) bi’ ( 1 &*ai)
sj( x)
*
ci ’ ( 1 &ai) xi& bixj
QED




Thus, stationary RF  equilibria are ubiquitous. This is not true, however, of SF equilibria. From
the second condition in (5), an equilibrium in SFs requires that, for each firm  i:
(7) ai ’ bi’
sj( x)
*( 1 %sj( x) )
But  then the first condition in (5) can then be satisfied only if   for each firm. This si( x) >&½
restriction  will be illustrated in the next section, where we derive the conditions under which such
equilibria are also asymptotically stable. 
To  conclude this section, however, we should comment on one aspect of our equilibrium analysis.
In  deriving (5), we considered the effect on firm  j’s  (discounted) profits of a perturbation in  xj, T
for  any single  T.  Thus, (5) is necessary for a  broad equilibrium in which   is optimal, for firm  j, ˆ Fj
among  all possible trajectories consistent with  .  However, if firm  j is restricted to strategies of ˆ Fi
the  form   then it cannot  independently vary any single  .  We might therefore wish Fj’+xj, 0, Dj, xj, T
to  consider a correspondingly  narrow equilibrium, in which   is optimal only among all  .  But ˆ Fj Fj
it is easily seen that (5) is necessary also for   to be a narrow equilibrium. Consider ( ˆ F1, ˆ F2)
alternative  strategies   comprising   and   each of which, in effect, fixes Fj xj, 0’xj Dj’ ( aj, 0, ( 1 &aj) xj)









Given   ,  the selection of such a strategy with   gives the same stationary trajectory, and the ˆ Fi xj’ ˆ xj
same  payoff to firm  j,  as does the selection of  .  So for   to be optimal among   it is necessary ˆ Fj ˆ Fj Fj
for (8) to be zero, when evaluated at  . Given (4), this requires (5) as before. ˆ x
5 Stability
As  shown by Robson (1986), and as noted section 1, FOLDRs cannot support subgame-perfect,
fully-rational  equilibria other than at the Cournot point. But in this section we show that FOLDRs
can  support stable equilibria over a wide range of output points, this size of this set being
negatively  related to the discount rate. We also characterise and locate the sets of such equilibria
supported,  respectively, by RFs and SFs. Stability may have some intrinsic interest in the fully-
rational  context, for example as a weak form of equilibrium refinement. But, in any case, our
results  here provide a useful background to our discussion of boundedly-rational equilibria, in
section 6, where stability and subgame-perfection are equivalent.
The  FOLDR pair   is (asymptotically) stable if and only if the trajectory of every  D F’+x0, D,
converges  to a common  ,  which must therefore be its unique stationary solution  . x0X S( D)
Necessary  and sufficient for this is that each of its two eigenvalues is within the unit circle. These
are given by:





Thus  for   to be stable requires at least that  .  Note that, since  ,  the eigenvalues D a0( &1 , 1 ) a 2$a1a2
will  be real if   is non-negative. One instance of this is where   for either firm, in  which b1b2 bi’0
case the eigenvalues are just  . { a1, a2}12
In  section 2 we noted the possibility of a regular  D with infinitely many stationary solutions, where
the two firms’ (linear) stationary sets coincide, so that  . Here, from (9): $1$2’1
8( D) ’ 1and 2 a&1
The  first eigenvalue   applies to each of the stationary solutions. The other eigenvalue 8( D) ’1
 applies to any other trajectory, all of which are linear and mutually parallel. If 8( D) ’2 a&1
 then they all converge, but not to the same stationary solution. We will describe such a a0( 0 , 1 )
D as  semi-stable. It will be of significance in what follows.
We now characterise and locate sets of stable, stationary equilibria. Consider firstly a pair of RFs
which, from (9), is stable if and only if:
&1< b1b2 < 1
From (6), a stationary equilibrium in RFs is therefore stable if and only if:
where     .  (10) &*2 < s( x)< *2 s( x) /s1( x) s2( x)
Figure  2 sketches this in the special case of a linear demand function   and identical p’ 1 &x1&x2
quadratic  costs  .  It shows the set  ,  bounded above by the (linear) zero-profit contours g( xi) ’x
2
i S
which  intersect at the output vector  ,  here denoted  z.  The output vector corresponding ( 1 / 3 , 1 / 3 )
to the Walrasian (price-taking) equilibrium is  , denoted  w.  The Cournot equilibrium is ( 1 / 4 , 1 / 4 )
at   ,  denoted  c,  and joint profit maximisation is achieved at  ,  denoted  m.  The ( 1 / 5 , 1 / 5 ) ( 1 / 6 , 1 / 6 )
curve  passing through  m is the contract curve, comprising points of mutual profit maximisation.
It is characterised by the mutual tangency of the two firms’ iso-profit contours, and thus by
. This is true also of the  curve passing through  w,  but which comprises points of mutual s( x) ’1
(local) profit  minimisation. We call this the  anti-contract curve.  The figure also shows, for each
firm,  the loci identified in section 3, which in this special case are linear. The Walrasian loci,  , Ti
are  the lines intersecting at  w.  The Cournot loci,  ,  are the lines intersecting at  c.  These Ni13
subdivide  S into four  main areas: two off-diagonal areas in which  , and two on-diagonal s( x) <0








1/4 1/3 1/2 0
s( x)>1
s( x)>1
s( x)<  !1
s( x)<  !1
x1
x2
Figure 2: Stationary equilibria with stable RFs
The  set of stationary equilibria in stable RFs, i.e., output points satisfying (10), is a strict subset
of   S.  At its largest, as  , it approaches the shaded region in Figure 2. It always lies strictly *61
above  the contract curve and below the anti-contract curve, along each of which  .  Off the s( x) ’1
diagonal,  it is bounded by curves along which  .  At its smallest, as  ,  it reduces to the s( x) ’&1 *60
cross  formed by  ,  which includes the Cournot point  c.  Each   is characterised by  , N1^N2 Ni si( x) ’0
and so satisfies (10) for any positive  *.
Figure  3 sketches the corresponding region for Supply Functions. Recall from the previous section
that SFs, unlike RFs, can  support stationary equilibria only where   for each firm. The si( x) >&½










Figure 3: Stationary equilibria with stable SFs
 From (9), a pair of SFs is stable if and only if:
&1< b1% b2 < 1
From (7), a stationary equilibrium in SFs is therefore stable if and only if:






At  its largest, as  ,  the set of stable, stationary SF equilibria approaches the shaded region in *61
Figure 3. It always lies strictly above the contract curve, along which  , and below curve r( x) ’1
shown  passing above  c,  along which  . At its smallest, as  ,  it reduces to the curve r( x) ’&1 *60
shown passing through  c, along which  . r( x) ’015
Having  looked in particular at RFs and SFs, we now consider FOLDRs in general. For any
 satisfying the equilibrium condition (5), the eigenvalues may be written as: D’( D1, D2)
(11) 8( D) ’ a ± a
2& a1a2% s( x)
*
2 ( 1 &*a1) ( 1 &*a2)
½
where   .  We have found that output points on the contract curve cannot be supported *ai0( &1 , 1 )
as  stationary equilibria either in stable RF pairs or in stable SF pairs. It is readily established that
such  points cannot be supported by stable FOLDRs at all. Suppose that  ,  as on the contract s( x) ’1
curve. From (11) it follows that:




whereby  at least one eigenvalue   is not within the  unit circle. Although at any point on the ( 1 / *)
contract  curve there exist stationary equilibria in FOLDRs, none of these is stable. In the limiting
case   there exist stationary equilibria, with  ,  which are semi-stable. Here, any ( *’1 ) a0( 0 , 1 )
deviation  from the stationary output trajectory will be followed by re-convergence, but in general
to some other stationary solution, off the contract curve.
So    is a requirement for stability of stationary equilibria, notably excluding the contract s( x) ￿1
curve. The following is more specific.
Proposition 2 For  there to exist an equilibrium   such that  D is stable and   is F’+x0, D, PF
stationary  at ,  it is necessary and (if each   is concave) sufficient x0S Bj( . )
that  . s( x) <*2
Proof:We first demonstrate necessity. Assume an equilibrium   such that   is F’+x0, D, PF
stationary at  x.  Suppose that  . Then from (11) the eigenvalues are real,  in which s( x) >0
case  D is stable only if:
*a* % a
2& a1a2% s( x)
*
2 ( 1 &*a1) ( 1 &*a2)
½
< 15 This can be confirmed by considering the arithmetic difference between the (positive)
denominator and the  numerator, and verifying that this must be non-negative. For any given  a,
this difference is minimised by setting  , given which it is: a1’a2’a
2 ( *a*&*a)& ( 1 &*2) a 2
This  expression  is a quadratic in each of its restrictions to, respectively, non-negative and non-
positive  values of  a.  As such, it is straightforward to verify that it is non-negative for any
. a0( &1 , 1 )
16




1% a1a2& 2 *a*
( 1 &*a1) ( 1 &*a2)
Stability  implies that  ,  and therefore that the right-hand side cannot exceed a0( &1 , 1 )
unity.
5 So stability here requires that  . s( x) <*2
We now demonstrate sufficiency. Given   and    such that  ,  put  *0( 0 , 1 ) x0S s( x) <*2 x0’x
and construct a stable  D satisfying (1) and (5). As in the proof of Proposition 1, put:
bi’ ( 1 &*ai)
sj( x)
*
ci ’ ( 1 &ai) xi& bixj





i % ( 1 & *
2a
2
i ) s( x) < *
2
This  may be viewed as is a generalisation of (10), and interpreted as requiring the
 average of 1 and   to lie within the open interval  .  It is ( *
2a
2
i ) &weighted s( x) ( &*2, *2)
straightforward  to verify (e.g., graphically) that, given any   and  ,  there *0( 0 , 1 ) s( x) <*2
always exist  to satisfy this. *ai0( &1 , 1 )
QED
So    is a necessary and (given concavity) sufficient condition for the existence of a stable, s( x) <*217
stationary equilibrium at  x. The set of output  points satisfying this can be visualised in Figure 2.
It comprises the  set of stable RF equilibria, plus the two off-diagonal areas in which  . At s( x) #0
its  smallest, as  ,  it reduces to just these two areas (which together include the Cournot loci). *60
El sewhere in  S,  i.e., where  ,  it has the same boundaries as the set of stable equilibria in s( x) >0
RFs. At its largest, as  , these are the contract curve and the anti-contract curve. *61
6 Subgame-perfection and a boundedly-rational equilibrium
In  this section we analyse a boundedly-rational equilibrium, where stability and subgame-
perfection  are equivalent. An equilibrium is subgame-perfect if the mutually–optimal strategies
would  remain so, following any deviation in either firm’s output in any period. Stability also
concerns  the consequences of output deviation, but not in any directly normative sense and, in the
fully-rational  context, we have seen that the two criteria are not generally co-extensive. However,
they  may be more closely related in the limiting case of zero discounting  .  Consider an ( *’1 )
equilibrium trajectory where the criterion of optimality,  for each firm, is its ‘long-run’ profit. If
D is stable, then following any deviation output re-converges to the same long-run, mutually-
optimal  point. A formal proposition of this kind is demonstrated by Stanford (1986b): with zero-
discounting,  a stable equilibrium in RFs must be subgame perfect. We now define a FOLDR
equilibrium  in which stability is not only sufficient, but also necessary, for subgame-perfection.
Assume that each firm  j seeks to maximise:
if   converges to some  Bj( x) P x0X
   Uj( P)/ 9 0 otherwise
The  first part of this definition is equivalent to a limit-of-mean-profit objective function. This
criterion  is commonly used, for example by Stanford, to represent zero discounting. Any output
sequence  with bounded profits is evaluated as the limit of its mean per-period profit. In the case
of a convergent sequence, this is just the value to which each period’s profit converges. 6 This is similar in spirit to an assumption made by Klemperer and Meyer (1989, p.1247),
i.e., that firms’ payoffs are zero when no unique equilibrium exists for given supply functions.  
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Although  our approach has been to allow unbounded output sequences, it is consistent with this
for  profit to be bounded, which is all that the limit-of-mean-profit criterion requires. So we could
follow  Stanford in applying this criterion. However, even when suitably bounded, the computation
an d evaluation of a non-convergent trajectory can be very difficult. A firm might therefore
economise  on computational time and expense by simply attaching a zero value to non-convergent
output trajectories,  as in the second part of the above definition.
6 The first part of the definition
could  similarly reflect computational constraints, rather than zero-discounting as such, for
convergent,  but non-stationary,  trajectories. So our objective function as a whole could be taken
to represent a form of bounded-rationality on the part of the firm.
Given this objective function, the characterisation of  a stationary equilibrium at  x is identical to
that  of a convergent equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium with a trajectory converging to  x.  In this
context,  the former is just a special case of the latter. So we can more generally locate output
points  at which there are convergent equilibria, among which there will always be a stationary
equilibrium.  Furthermore, for an equilibrium with a stable  D the initial output vector   is x0
irrelevant.  A stable equilibrium can be unambiguously located in output space by the unique
stationary  solution  ,  in the knowledge that this locates a convergent equilibrium for any  . S( D) x0
Indeed,  this is why such an equilibrium is subgame-perfect. These observations will be elaborated
more  formally below. Firstly, though, we characterise a boundedly-rational equilibrium, by
considering  some   such that   converges to  .  Given  ,  under what conditions is  ˆ F’( ˆ F1, ˆ F2) Pˆ F ˜ x ˆ Fi ˆ Fj
optimal for firm  j? 
Suppose  firstly that  ,  so that firm  i’s  output converges to  ,  irrespective of firm  j’s  strategy. ˆ bi’0 ˜ xi
Thus  any output trajectory which firm  j can induce through its own strategy choice will converge,
if  at all, only to some   such that  .  But firm  j can induce a trajectory converging to any x0X xi’ ˜ xi
such  x, simply by choosing an appropriate convergent trajectory for its own output, i.e.:
  aj0( &1 , 1 ) bj’0 cj ’ ( 1 &aj) xj19
It  follows that   is optimal, in terms of the boundedly-rational objective function, if and only if  ˆ Fj ˜ x
maximises    subject to  .  Necessary and (given quasiconcavity) sufficient for this is that Bj( x) xi’ ˜ xi
.  The reasoning here closely parallels that in section 4, and it is straightforward to verify sj( ˜ x) ’0
the  existence of a stationary Cournot equilibrium, strategically identical to that in the fully-rational
case.  In this boundedly-rational case we may also verify the existence of equilibrium trajectories
converging to, but not necessarily stationary at, the Cournot point.
Now  suppose instead that  .  Any trajectory which firm  j can induce through its own strategy ˆ bi￿0
choice  will converge, if at all, only to some  .  But firm  j can induce a trajectory x0Si( ˆ Di)
converging to any such  x, as confirmed in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 For any    such that  ,  and for any  , there exists some   such that Di bi￿0 x0Si( Di) Dj
 is stable and  . D’( D1, D2) S( D) ’{ x}
Proof:Given   and  x, construct a stable  D satisfying (1), e.g.: Di
  aj’&ai bj’&a
2
j / bi cj ’ ( 1 &aj) xj& bjxi
QED
Note  that   is crucial to this proposition. If instead  ,  as in a Cournot equilibrium, then bi￿0 bi’0
the eigenvalues are  , so that firm  j cannot independently ensure stability. { a1, a2}
So,  given that  ,  firm  j can induce a trajectory converging to, and only to, any  .  It bi￿0 x0Si( ˆ Di)
follows  that   is optimal, in terms of the boundedly-rational objective function, if and only if  ˆ Fj ˜ x
solves:
max.    subject to:     Bj( x) xi ’ ˆ aixi % ˆ bixj % ˆ ci
Necessary and (given our assumption of quasiconcavity) sufficient for this is that:




which  may be compared with (5), the corresponding condition for fully-rational equilibrium. The
second  part of (12) confirms the equivalence to the limiting case of zero discounting  . ( *’1 )
However  the first part, that   be regular, is considerably weaker than the limiting case of the ˆ Di
corresponding part of  (5), which is that  . This reflects our strong assumption that the ˆ ai0( &1 , 1 )
boundedly-rational firm places a zero value on any non-convergent trajectory. 
Note  that (12) also characterises any (convergent) Cournot equilibrium in which   is regular, and ˆ Di
therefore  where   is optimal if and only if   maximises   subject to  .  A Cournot ˆ Fj ˜ x Bj( x) x0Si( ˆ Di)
equilibrium in which    cannot be thus characterised, since here  .  ˆ Di’( 1 , 0 , 0 ) Si( ˆ Di) ’X
From (12) we can confirm that stationary, boundedly-rational equilibria are ubiquitous.
Proposition 3 For  any  there exists a boundedly-rational equilibrium   such x0S F’+x0, D,
that   is stationary at  x. PF
Proof:Given  x, put  , and construct  D to satisfy (1) and (12), i.e.: x0’x
ai￿1 bi’ ( 1 &ai) sj( x) ci ’ ( 1 &ai) xi& bixj
QED
Among  the equilibria characterised by (12) are those which are (perhaps) non-stationary, but in
which    is stable, with a unique stationary solution at  . Such cases are really equilibria in ˆ D ˜ x
decision  rules  rather than in strategies    as such. Furthermore, they are subgame- ( ˆ D1, ˆ D2) ( ˆ F1, ˆ F2)
perfect.  An equilibrium   is subgame-perfect if and only if at any future time  t,  the ˆ F’( ˆ F1, ˆ F2)
adopted  strategies remain mutually optimal from any feasible position, whether or not on the
equilibrium  trajectory. In the present context, this requires that at any time  t,    is optimal given ˆ Dj
, and given any feasible  . But all features  of the market are time-independent, including the ˆ Di xt
objective  functions. So this is equivalent simply to requiring that   are mutually optimal, ( ˆ D1, ˆ D2)
regardless of  . x021
Proposition 4a If    is a boundedly-rational equilibrium, and if   is stable, then ˆ F’+ˆ x0, ˆ D, ˆ D
any   is a subgame-perfect boundedly-rational equilibrium. F’+x0, ˆ D,
Proof: If    is stable then the trajectory of any   converges to   which by  assumption, ˆ D F’+x0, ˆ D, ˜ x
for  each firm  j,  maximises   subject to  . (Note that this applies also to the Bj( x) x0Si( ˆ Di)
Cournot equilibrium, where stability entails that    is regular.) Given  , therefore, firm ˆ D ˆ Di
j can induce no better trajectory than this. So   is a boundedly-rational F’+x0, ˆ D,
equilibrium. Since the same argument  applies at any subsequent time  t,  for any given  , xt
the equilibrium is also subgame-perfect.
QED
Th is is similar to the proposition demonstrated for RFs under zero-discounting by Stanford
(1986b).  Given our boundedly-rational objective function, however, the following converse
proposition is also true.
Proposition 4b  A boundedly-rational equilibrium  ,  with a trajectory converging ˆ F’+ˆ x0, ˆ D,
to   , is subgame-perfect only if   is stable. ˜ x ˆ D
Proof:Assume  that   is not stable. We require to show that the equilibrium is therefore ˆ D’( ˆ D1, ˆ D2)
not subgame-perfect.
Suppose  firstly that   for some firm  i.  If   is not stable then there is some ˆ bi￿0 ˆ D’( ˆ D1, ˆ D2)
 such that  the trajectory of   does not converge to  . But from Lemma 1 x0￿ˆ x0 F’+x0, ˆ D, ˜ x
there exists some  , with  , such that  the trajectory of   does converge to D Di’ˆ Di F’+x0, D,
.  So, given  ,    is not the best response to  .  Thus, the equilibrium is not subgame- ˜ x x0 ˆ Dj ˆ Di
perfect. 
Suppose  instead that   for each firm  i,  and therefore that the eigenvalues are  . ˆ bi’0 {ˆ a1, ˆ a2}
If   is  not stable, then   for at least one firm  j.  Lemma 1 does not apply here, ˆ D ˆ aj￿( &1 , 1 )
since  the other eigenvalue is   . However, irrespective of the value of  ,  there is some  ˆ ai ˆ ai x0
such  that the trajectory of   does not converge to  , but would do so were F’+x0, ˆ D, ˜ x22
.  Any   such that   is of this type, these being the eigenvectors aj0( &1 , 1 ) x0￿˜ x xi, 0’ ˜ xi
corresponding  to the eigenvalue  .  So for at least one firm  j there exists some  ,  given aj x0
which   is not the best response to  . Thus, the equilibrium is not subgame-perfect.   ˆ Dj ˆ Di
QED
So  a boundedly-rational equilibrium   is subgame-perfect, and thus essentially an ˆ F’+ˆ x0, ˆ D,
equilibrium  in decision rules, if and only if   is stable. It now remains to locate the set of such ˆ D
equil ibria. We know, from Proposition 3, that a stationary equilibrium can be found at any
profitable  output point. But this is not so for stable equilibria. There are boundedly-rational
equilibria with stationary (and otherwise convergent) trajectories for which    cannot be stable. ˆ D
Significantly,  these occur on the contract curve. Consider an equilibrium  ,  with a ˆ F’+ˆ x0, ˆ D,
trajectory  converging to some   on the contract curve, i.e., such that  .  From (12) it ˜ x s( ˜ x) ’1
follows  that  ,  i.e., that the two firms’ stationary sets coincide. So there are infinitely many ˆ $1ˆ $2’1
stationary  solutions other than  ,  and   is not stable. At best, i.e., if  ,  is semi-stable. ˜ x ˆ D ˆ a0( 0 , 1 )ˆ D
But  this does not suffice for subgame-perfection. There exists some   (arbitrarily close to  ) x0 ˆ x0
such that the trajectory of   converges to some stationary solution other than  ,  and less +x0, ˆ D, ˜ x
profitable  for at least one firm  j.  But from Lemma 1 we know that, given  ,  there is some  ˆ Di Dj￿ˆ Dj
which does ensure convergence to  . So, given such an  ,   are not mutually optimal. ˜ x x0 ( ˆ D1, ˆ D2)
Just as  in the fully-rational case, therefore,   is necessary for a stable, boundedly-rational s( x) ￿1
equilibrium to be located at  x. In this case, we may show that it is also sufficient. 
Proposition 5  For there  to exist a boundedly-rational equilibrium   such that  D F’+x0, D,
is  stable and   converges to  ,  it is necessary and sufficient that PF x0S
. s( x) ￿ 1
Proof:Necessity  has already been demonstrated. To demonstrate sufficiency, construct a stable
D which, given  x , satisfies (1) and (12). As for Proposition 3, put:
bi’ ( 1 &ai) sj( x) ci ’ ( 1 &ai) xi& bixj23
Put also  , so that from (11)  D is stable if: a’0
&1 < a
2
i % ( 1 & a
2
i ) s( x) < 1
Given that  , it is always possible to find some   which satisfies this. s( x) ￿1 ai￿1
QED
So  there is a stable boundedly-rational equilibrium located (i.e., with its stationary solution) at any
profitable  output point except on the contract curve and the anti-contact curve. This near-ubiquity
reflects  our strong assumption that non-convergent trajectories have zero value, and therefore that
each  firm’s FOLDR need only be regular. By contrast, in the limiting case   of the stationary ( *’1 )
fully-rational  equilibrium the corresponding existence condition is  ,  which additionally s( x) <1
excludes output points below the contract curve and above the anti-contract curve.
The  sets of stable RF and SF boundedly-rational equilibria can similarly be deduced from the
limiting  cases of their respective stationary, fully-rational counterparts. For RFs this is
straightforward;  in Figure 2 the relevant set is represented by the shaded region. For SFs note that




Given which the first condition in (12) is automatically satisfied. So, in the boundedly-rational
case,  the (linear) boundaries shown in Figure 3 do not apply. The set of stable SF equilibria is just
the curved region bounded below by the contract curve.
To  summarise: we have established that stable, boundedly-rational equilibria in FOLDRs can be
found  almost anywhere in (positive-profit) output space. Excluded, however, are points of mutual
profit-maximisation on the contract curve.  There are boundedly-rational equilibria with outputs
stationary at such points, but these are not stable and, therefore, not subgame-perfect. 24
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